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The following pages contain the transcript of a committee 
experiment of the type first introduced by Fiorina and Plott [ 1]. 
The subjects, law students in their second year of study were very 
articulate, sensitive to moral concerns, and skilled in strategic 
behavior. Their conversations, debates and reflections might provide 
a good source of data for scholars seeking to explain the equilibrium 
decision made by similar groups. The transcript may also provide 
some experience for those interested in field applications of laboratory 
results with the type of social environment within which mathematical 
models are known to work. 
The conversations are as complete as could be obtained from 
the recording. Little or no editing has been done. Experimenter 
comments or observations always appear in brackets -- [like this]. 
The committee's problem was to pick a point in the positive 
quadrant of a two dimensional Euclidean space. The preference 
1. The financial support of the National Science Foundation is 
gratefully acknowledged. I wish to thank the research assistants 
Randy Calvert, James Hong and Darwin Niekerk for their help. 
patterns, induced in accord with the theory of induced preference 
found at [3], and the ope rationalized at [ 1), [2] shown as Figure 1. 
The points 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively indicate the points of highest 
possible payment for the individuals indexed as 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The 
figure also indicates the colored areas referenced in the agenda. 
Payoff amounts are on Figure 2 and a detailed example of individual 
incentive chart is Appendix B. Individuals in this experimental 
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setting are allowed to reveal nothing quantitative about their incentives 
(only ordinal information can be verbalized) and there can be no 
deals to "split" their profits afterward. (See [2]). 
The group was to use majority rule and follow the agenda 
found in the instructions in Appendix A. The agenda is known to 
systematically influence the outcome [2]. This particular agenda 
was designed to get the group to choose the point (25, 72). Very 
early in the experiment these subjects chose to disregard the agenda 
and substituted, essentially, the procedures used in the Fiorina-
Plott [ 1] experiments. With these substitute procedures committees 
in general tend to choose the equilibrium point (39, 68). This tends 
to occur when the committee members can openly engage in conversa-
tions such as they do here, and it also tends to occur when the 
committee members can say nothing other than what is necessary 
to make proposals and vote. Experiments subsequent to the one 
reviewed here have demonstrated that when this agenda is rigidly 
followed 2 the decision does not tend to be (39, 68) nor does it tend 
to be the point (25, 72), for which the agenda was designed. It 
tends to be either (30, 68) or (37, 70) depending upon whether the 
light area or the dark area was chosen at item number l. See 
Figure 3. 
2. Discussions not "gerrnaine" to the iten1 under consideration 
are ruled out of order. 
The final outcome of this experimental session was (39, 68). 
The group first ignored the agenda and then "agreed" on a point 
(39, 68). They then went through the agenda and the point (39, 68) 
survived. So we know four things about the conversations below. 
First, they have some similarity to the discussions and arguments 
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in which we have all engaged while participating in committee delibera-
tions. Secondly, something occurred which caused the participants 
to shift from the voting strategies they usually use which make the 
agenda models work, to the sophisticated strategies generally used 
here when they finally go through the agenda. Third, the conversations 
here are rich and diverse enough to support almost every conceivable 
theory about group decisions. Game theorists in particular might be 
able to see more clearly the motivation which lies behind theories 
which have their origins in behavioral studies of committee behavior 
as opposed to broad overriding principles of strategic behavior. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we know that the conversations 
and arguments were!!£.!_ responsible for the choice of the point (39, 68). 
Given the procedures, implicit in the agreement to disregard the 
agenda, the point would have been chosen even if no conversations at 
all, other than proposals and voting, had taken place. The theories 
which receive support from these conversations cannot account for 
the results. 
We turn now to the text of the experiment. 
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LAW SCHOOL CLASSROOM 
11 September 1975, 2:05p.m. 
EXPERIMENTERS: 
P. (C. Plott) 
TEXT 
C. (R. Calvert-- Graduate student research assistant) 
N. (D. Niekerk -- Graduate student research assistant). Chair-
man and without knowledge of predicted points. 
INSTRUCTIONS: The instructions were read by C. Plott. 
answered all clarifying questions. Niekerk then read 
relevant portions of the chairman's instructions. 
He also 
the 
N. All right, I am going to give each of you a number, you are No. 1, 
2, 3, 4 and 5, and I would like you to put on top of your instruction 
book your name, social security number, (the reason we have to 
have that is because the people that gave us the money would like to 
know who we gave the money to) and the number that I just gave you. 
I also want you to put the x and y coordinates of your best point. 
Okay, is everybody ready? 
1. Mike [ 30, 52] 
2. Bob [ 165, 32] 
3. Charlie [ 25, 72] 
4. Jeanine [62, 1 09] 
5. O'Malley [ 39, 68] 
l. Just one moment. 
N. All right, so the first item on the agenda, under Item 1, dark versus 
light and the light colors are light blue, light green, yellow, orange 
and pink, and the dark colors are dark blue, dark green and dark 
red. Okay, the committee is open. 
2. Well, I think that each of us would be fairly satisfied with the vast 
bulk of the area covered on the map. Most of it, I think, will please 
me and most of the people here, accordingly since most of the 
diagrams are dark colors that probably more of us would be better 
off if we at least started with dark, and it would be more likely to 
get a good result if we went with dark colors. 
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3. I don't think my map looks like yours in general, if I picked a dark 
color, it would have to be dark green or dark red and it would have 
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to be within a fairly narrow range of x coordinates and y coordinates. 
l. I'm in the same position too. Primarily to me a lighter color is 
better and most of my map is excluded ... 
3. Most of my map has very low numbers, only in a very limited area 
has high numbers. 
l. While there are some high numbers in dark color regions, a lighter 
color would seem to give me the higher. 
N. If you want to debate or anything, you can just go ahead and debate 
by yourself, and when you would like to take a vote, then raise your 
hand and tell me. 
5. I, I don't know whether .... I suppose, this is by design .... I 
would prefer having the decision in a darker color. They are 
structured in such a way to be considerably more preferable to 
the light colors. I see a rapid diminution in my interest as we 
get into the light region. Wow! You would really hammer me. 
(laughter). 
4. I must be the tie- breaker because my optimum area is in the light 
area but the area immediately beyond that is reasonably okay and 
it is completely dark. 
3. What colors are dark? 
4. Dark green and dark red. 
2. And dark blue. 
3. Dark green is satisfactory to me. It is best for me. 
2. Well, we don't have to decide that yet. 
l. My optimal point is in the light area but there are some points in 
the dark area which are quite good. 
5. Right, my optimal point is in the dark red and there are dark greens 
and dark blues, great proxitnity to that point also, but once we get 
in the lighter color we immediately drop way off from the optimal 
point. It, the value, rapidly diminishes. 
l. I can get fairly high numbers in dark green and dark red but dark 
blue is out. 
5. Oh! 
4. Similar to mine. 
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5. My dark blue isn't that great either but I once again I don't have to 
worry about which color right now because it seems dark blue would 
be . . . . It does seem that everybody has at least arrived at the 
tentative decision of the darker colors, supplying us all with a 
broader range of alternatives. 
1. Let's find out which dark colors we are talking about. We might get 
locked into a dark color and find out that each of us is talking about 
a different dark color. [He seems to sense the principle which lies 
behind agenda manipulation. Under the strict interpretation of the 
agenda this suggestion would have been ruled out of order since it 
entails discussing items which appear later. We have had enough 
experience to know that this suggestion may cause the outcome to be 
different than predicted by the agenda model. Since we are still 
exploring the bounds of agenda ideas we had decided, prior to the 
experiment to allow such discussions.] 
5. I was talking about dark green and dark red and I suppose there are 
a couple points, not so many in dark blue. 
1. The points where dark green and dark red are good for me are 
limited to a very small point in my diagram and there are a lot of 
common points of dark red and dark green. 
3. Even though we arrive at a color that would be at an optimum point 
satisfactory to all of us doesn't mean that we can possibly arrive at 
any coordinates within that color that would be satisfactory. 
5. Let's start talking about coordinates. 
3. We have to talk about coordinates it seems to me, can we talk about 
which coordinate we want? 
N. Yes. [The agenda, in part, goes out at this point.] 
3. Can we assume all of the coordinates are the same? 
N. Has everybody this x axis and y axis? 
3. All of our colors can form .... 
4. You say that the patchwork is the same? 
5. Can you take notes on the board or we have to remember? 
N. I guess you can. 
5. Can we write on our sheets? 
N. On the back pages of your instructions there are some but you can 
write on the chart. 
l. Let's get everyone's optimum point. 
Iter~ 1 
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[xperimen t.q l 
·Outcome 
(17 ,69) 
(37' 70) 
(37 '70) 
(37 '7?.) 
(39,68)* 
(30,68) 
2. Yeah. 
3. All right. 
l. Mine's at 30 on the x axis and 52 y axis. 
3. (30, 52)? 
l. Yeah. 
5. Is that (x, y)? 
l. Yeah, 30 on the bottom, 52 up. 
3. All right, what's yours? 
2. Mine appears to be way different from everyone else's, mine is 165 
on the x and 32 on the y which puts me in a light color, but, ah, I 
guess I, ah, would turn that down. 
l. 165 what? 
2. 32. 
l. I can see why they said "no physical threats." 
? . Is that your optimal point? 
2. Yes, regrettably. 
(Laughter). 
3. (165, 32). Yea, you are barely 1n the yellow. That is nice isn't it? 
My optimal point is (25, 72). 
5. Can we talk about the colors, this is quarter light green ana orange? 
How does that work? 
l. Do we all have the same color patterns? 
N. Yes. 
? As long as we vote in the light color pattern we'll be set .... later on 
we take a vote on where we want to be on the axis. 
4. My optimal point is (62, 109). 
l. A hundred and what? 
4. Nine. 
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3. It appears to me that what we want to do is to pick our point, and then 
we can go to the colors that we need. [A new agenda is prepared here.] 
2. (62, 109)? 
4. Right. 
l. What about yours O'Malley? 
5. Mine is (39, 68), 39 x axis, 68 on they axis. Puts me in the dark 
red. 
l. (39 .... 68). [All "best points" have been correctly revealed now.] 
2. Well, I realize that given my apparently inferior (laughter) .•• it is 
going to be difficult to convince you to adopt a 160, approximate! y, 
x coordinate, but I kind of hope that like ... to move .•• picking a 
point even equal distant between the other points that each of you 
has, and move it if you can, you know, towards me just a little, I 
am not even expecting that it would be near a 100 mark. [This 
would almost assure him $20. 00.] 
3. Ah, you know that moving that way might not be a great idea frankly 
because even if we move it, in order to move it far enough to make 
a difference ... you way down there . . • can we talk about the value 
ranges down there ? [ 3 has the directly opposite preferences at 
equilibrium and would get $0.01 at x = 100.] 
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N. You can talk about coordinates but cannot talk about monetary amounts. 
5. Oh, can't talk about monetary amounts. 
3. Let's just put it this way, for me if I go beyond approximately 50 on 
the x coordinate, I get down to a neglibible, utterly negligible amount. 
[3 - max $1. 50.] 
l. I get very low starting at about 45 or 50 ••• 45, I guess. [ 1- max $14. 00] 
4. Fellows, it seems like that ... 
2. Wait a second, I don't understand you are talking about a horizontal 
move that number ... 
l. Yeah, if you went beyond 50. 
2. On the x number, you mean? 
l. Yeah. 
3. 40 to 45, if I went beyond that, it wouldn't be worth my time. Near 
55, I'm just about zip. 
l. Near 55, you are? 
4. Fellows, it seems like right around 45 or 50 x, between 80 to 85 y 
seems to be fairly equal distant between about four positions and 
should maximize the group effort. [Her $30. 00 - $35. 00 range.] 
5. (Pause). I want to get the rules straight. We can't make any 
discussion about sharing? 
N. That's correct. 
l. Okay, I think at this point we know where each other are. 
3. I think it would be a definite community interest, I, 3 and 5 to be 
in dark green. [Coalition proposal.] 
5. It can be either dark green or red-- well, you know, probably dark 
green but no matter what, perhaps it might be a good idea if voted 
on going to the dark versus light vote right now. [His max is in the 
dark.] 
3. I don't know why, it seems to me that the only thing that counts is 
the point we pick. [His max is in the light.] 
l. Yeah. Figure out the point we want and then just zoom right through 
the items. [His max is in the light.] 
5. Oh, okay. 
2. I really, again .•. it's ... it's difficult situation but like you people 
have mentioned that 50 would be, you know, as far over towards 
desert that you could go (laughter) and if you could pick a point on 
the 50 line at least ... I won't get ... it will not be a great deal of 
fun but at least it will be something ..• I think somebody mentioned 
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a point on the 50 line, would that be ••. seem •.. [2- $20. 50 • $20. 70.] 
5. Something like maybe (50, 80) something like that. [5- $0. 82.] 
2. Yeah, (50, 80), (50, 70) whatever is in the ball-game here. 
[2 - $14.00 - $19.00.] 
5. Well, let me ask this. 
2. Well, that would be fairly close to points 1, 3, and 5. 
3. No, no, to me it's very roughly tapered off at that point. [3 - $1. 50.] 
l. Yeah, and very bad for me too. Can we get some names here? 
[ $2.00 -- Note the request for names -- it frequently occurs.] 
3. Charlie. 
2. You are (25, 72)? 
3. Yeah. 
5. Now let me get those numbers and names ... what is your name? 
l. (30, 52). 
5. Bob, where are you? 
2. Way out, in the middle of the little yellow square way over to the right. 
5. Charlie, where are you? 
3. I am at (25, 72). 
5. What is your name? 
4. Jeanine. 
5. Where are you, Jeanine? 
4. I am at (62, 109). 
2. But that's why, O'Malley, I said the point 70 because that's on the 
y axis, because that appears to be just as far from I and 3 on the y 
axis to point (50, 70) seems to be about equidistant from points I 
and 3. [2 - $19.00.] 
5. How is (50, 70) for you? 
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3. Oh, I am down there where it doesn't amount to much at all. [3- $1. 50,] 
I. I am down there too. [I- $2. 00.] 
4. Yeah, it's bad for me, 50 is all right but I ... at least until 80. 
2. Mike, your number is what? 
3. (30, 52). 
2. Well. .. 
3. If we get it any lower towards .•. 
2. Just look at the concentration of those 
I. Yeah. 1, 3 and 5. 
2. 1, 3 and 5 is the place to make money, those three. 
l. If the distribution is anything similar -- it would seem to me the best 
point to be is around (35, 64) or (35, 63). [1- $16.00 • $18.00.] 
2. 35 what? 
l. (35, 63). 
2. Not for you, Jeanine, it wouldn't be. [2 - $2.00 - $3. 30.] 
4. No. [4-$1.70.] 
2. What about a point other 
[ 2 - $20. 55] 
O'Malley, what about a point, ah, (58, 80)? 
5. You don't have to talk to me so much, Bob .•. it's Charlie and Mike 
you are talking to because you are moving further away from them 
than from me because my number is ... 
2. No. Aren't you 40 something? 
5. (39, 68). 
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2. Yeah, (39, 68) you know what I mean. [Suggesting a coalition?] 
5. See you are still talking about something in my range, when you are 
talking to me, but for them ..• [ 5 - $0. 27] 
2. I am talking precisely to you. 
5. I know, but you are talking out of their range. 
3. I would suggest that the best thing 
to do here is not to look to the, ah, 
ah, overall societal, ah, maximiza-
tion of, ah, income here and that, 
ah, with the utility of the money; if 
you have it, it seems best to go for 
the large numbers, rather than 
distribution. 
5. How about (33, 65), Mike? That 
puts us right in the middle of that 
triangle between you, myself and 
Charlie. [ 5 - $3. 50] 
1. (33, 65)? 
5. Yeah, check that out. 
Proposed points and proposing 
individuals in parenthesis. 
1. (33, 65) that's okay. It would be better moving further down on the 
y axis. [ 1 - $20. 00] 
5. How about (33, 64)? [ 5 - $3. 25] 
1. (33, 64). [ 1 - $22. 00] 
3. No, we just lost a lot of money over here. If you'd try (30, 65) that 
would be fine. [ 3 - $16.00 at (33, 65); $14.00 at (33, 64); $20.00 
at (30, 65.] 
5. (30, 65) is okay for me. [ 5 - $2. 25] 
1. You're really moving me out now. The Grand Design is becoming 
more apparent now. O'Malley! ... [ 1- $19.00 at (30, 65).] 
5. Let's see, ah .•• 
3. Let's see we can't talk about percentages either, can we? (Note the 
attempt to get at the quantities.] 
P. No. 
2. O'Malley, I think, between me, Jeanine and yourself, you know 
where she is. 
5. Right, I know where she is. 
2. What is the situation there, are you at all sympathetic to a point 
between the two of you? 
5. Well, see, you know the point is, I can get a lot closer to those two 
guys with moving very little and in order to get out there to Jeanine 
I've got to get down there towards .•• fairly small value to me and 
if she comes closer to me it is going to come progressively less 
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valuable to her also. (He is thinking of "half-way" as being "cooperative".] 
4. I don't know if all of these values are similar but it seems to me 
there is a large break in values at one point in the scale. 
2. Right, it does drop off all of a sudden. 
3. Mine drops considerably, can we talk about percentages? (This is 
another attempt to get comparisons.] 
N. No. 
3. Mine drops off considerably. 
1. O'Malley, from (33, 62) which way would you move, you to Charlie's? 
[ 1 - $2.5. 00. Note the change in the "status guo" from (30, 65) and/or 
(33, 64).] 
3. I would move left there, that's a very sharp drop off in money for 
me. [ 3- $11. 00; a one unit move left would give him $13. 39.] 
1. Okay, very bad for you where? 
3. This is difficult because we don't know how little money the other 
people are getting on these things, as far as I know the best 
presumption that we can make, is that we are all standing to make 
somewhere around the same amount at the center point, and that 
the drop off is somewhat similar. 
2. That's just a crap shoot. [ 2- $2.25 at (33, 62).] 
3. We're in the blind either way. We are in the blind on that. 
1. I think if the three of us can get up to a point that maximizes what 
we can make, you know -- as a voting block the three ... 
[Coalition proposal?) 
3. Maximization is simply has to be, ah, we have to do something 
like make a rating of one to ten on how much we want of a certain 
point and then assign different numbers to those points. 
l. I think by picking points we can narrow it down. 
4. It seems to n1e one thing we should observe is that the scales are 
similar, the increments when we get away from the center point, 
the advantage to be gained or lost is very small, at least on rnine. 
[ 4- $1.50 at (33, 62).] 
3. Immediately it doesn't go down fast, but then at about six lines out 
it begins to go down very fast. 
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5. No! Mine's different from that. Mine has a considerable premium 
on the center point and from there to the very next line decreases 
tremendously as a proportion. It drops off quite rapidly. [Notice 
that he completely understands his incentives. Later he asks to 
have this explained at what seems to be an "appropriate" time. The 
use of "proportion" here is also illegal.] 
1. Is that right? Mine holds steady for about five lines from my 
center. [Correct.] 
3. That holds true for me for about three. [The correct number is three.] 
5. I could say that I'll be happy with, you know, well anyway, it drops 
off quite a bit. 
3. Let me ask this, if we can't discuss the sums, can we assign, can 
we develop, say one to ten rating where we would rate different 
places and use those? 
N. No. [This involves quantitative information-- ratios.] 
2. 
4. 
2. 
1. 
5. 
). 
What's your drop off, how far away can you go? 
I need to go out at least 50, and up at least 72. [ 4- $19.00 at 
(50, 72); $34. 00 at (50, 75).] 
That's as far as you can go? 
O'Malley, I'm trying to find out what your grid pattern looks like so 
that we can get to a point somewhere in this triangle. How fast does 
yours drops off from your point? [His tone presumes that the three 
of them have agreed to his coalition suggestion above.] 
From my ... from my ... well look, I think what we've got to do Mike 
is we each know what our center point is for the three of us. That is 
what we've got to go for. [Somehow 5 has slipped into an agreement 
here which he later regrets.] 
That's what we've i!Ot to go for. 
5. We've got to play around inside that triangle. 
2. Wait a second. 
5. What we should do, I think, is we know which direction to draw a 
triangle between the points, we have already done that, okay, and 
by drawing a line which bisects angle ... 
3. That won't necessarily do it. 
5. No, that will give us the center point, that's a starting point, center 
point of the triangle, okay, and we know that the numbers are going 
to decrease in the least amount of time heading directly away from 
each of our points. That's the direction in which the numbers will 
decrease least rapidly, simply because you will be running per-
pendicular to the lines, okay? Rather than going off on a tangent 
across them. [ 5- $2.50 at (31, 64), the center.] 
2. Pardon me, say this again. 
5. We want to get towards the center of the triangle. 
1. Yeah. [ 1 - $22. 79 at (31, 64).] 
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2. Have you ever thought that might actually not be the most profitable 
for you people because apparently there is a very different droo off 
pattern and the fact that, granted, you three are closest, it may be 
that the way this is set up, that it will not be optimal for one or more 
of you to go with the middle part of the three. 
3. Yeah, furthermore, it might be that you have a tremendous sum of 
money down there in the corner and we've got just trivial sums of 
money relative to what you've got. 
2. 
5. 
5. 
1. 
3. 
This is no tremendous sum that we have. 
Taking a piece of paper and putting our 
three points, we can draw a triangle 
on separate piece of paper. By drawing 
lines bisect the angles formed by the 
three sides of that triangle, we'll come 
up to our center point, then we don't have 
to pick a point to know in which direction 
our value will be going up or down. 
How far is your center point approximately? 
I have, ah, (32, 65) center point. [This is 
a slight error but they use it. The error 
is not in l's favor.] 
What is your point, O'Malley? 
5. (39, 68). 
Continuation of proposed points 
and proposing individuals in 
parenthesis. 
1. Okay, let's just pick (32, 65) and discuss which way we'd like to 
move from there. [ 1 - $19. 00] 
5. Okay. 
3. Now, I can go either up ..• 
5. (32, 65)? I say 65 or 66 maybe. [ 5 - $2.ll0 at (32, 65) and $3.25 at 
( 32, 66).] 
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3. I can go up one or to the left one and make quite a good jump, just 
one number or two numbers. Two numbers, two little boxes to the 
left or two boxes up I can make fairly good percentage increase. 
[ $18. 64 with $3. 00 additional per unit to the left.] 
5. Okay, I can go, can I say how many points? 
N. Yeah. 
5. Can I say how many points I can go without making a change in value? 
3. How many monetary points? 
5. No, not how many dollars, how many grid points I can go up without 
a change in value? 
3. Sure, sure. 
P. That means, there is absolutely no change at all? Okay. 
5. I can go up from the point (32, 66) okay, ... on that point. I can go 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5. I can go up to 71. (Correct] 
l. That's 71. 
5. I can go up to (32, 70) without a monetary change. (No gain over (32, 66).] 
3. I can go better than that. 
l. Okay, I get way back. 
2. You, I'll bet you do, you see because that's running right along ••• 
3. See, if you guys draw the line alike I said you can see the direction 
that it will be diminishing as you move down, that is bisecting the 
angles, and that point up is almost parallel to the direction in which 
it diminishes most rapidly for mine. 
3. O'Malley, what happens to you if we go two boxes to the left? 
5. I drop off quite a bit. ( $0. 75] 
3. You drop off a lot? 
5. Yeah, I can go .•• 
l. From our center point (32, 65), if I go down one, how does it help 
you or hurt you? 
3. Ah, we're losing fairly fast there. ( $18.64 to $16. 00] 
l. Just one. 
3. Down from where? 
l. From the center point. 
3. Down one and to the left one would be staying the same. (Correct] 
5. Well, if you're going to the left one, then I'm out. ( $3. 25 to $2. 60] 
3. You are out, okay. 
5. But, ah, down one doesn't hurt me at all. 
l. Down one doesn't hurt me, it helps me. 
5. And down one and half doesn't hurt me actually. [This is about 
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like moving to the left one unit which he objected to above. It seems 
he is partial to 1 as revealed here and later.] 
3. Well, we're dropping off fast over here. 
5. Okay, how about down one, that gives Mike a little help, he is the 
furthest one out. It doesn't hurt you and it doesn't hurt me. 
3. So what y coordinate are we talking about? 
5. That would be (32, 65). [ $3. 25] 
3. (32, 65)-- yea, that's not a bad point. [ $18. 64] 
5. How about you, Mike? 
l. Pretty good. [ $19. 00] 
5. Okay, that's it. [It seems over at this point which is the point pre-
dicted by "resource" coalition theories. But, 2 speaks up immediately.] 
2. How is (40, 62) for O'Malley and Charles? Who is something like 
(30, 52)? 
l. That's me. ( 40, 62)? 
2. Yeah. Alright, for you and O'Malley? 
1. I couldn't do that, I'm getting down to negligible sums on that one. 
[1- $15.00.] 
2. Right. 
1. I've fallen off from the other one. 
2. How's (40, 60) then? ( Z - $7. 88] 
l. (40, 60)? 
2. Yeah. 
1. Ah, that's ... I'm indifferent between the two points. [ l - $19.50 at 
(40, 60); $19.00 at (32, 65).] 
5. (40, 60)? 
2. Yeah. 
3. I'm getting out of the ... out of the running here. [3 - $4.2 5.] 
5. It's the same. [Correct -- Notice here we have an interesting 
balance similar to the bargaining set and/or competitive solution, 
between (32, 65) and (40, 60) with (1, 5, 3) with the former and 
( 1, 5, 2) with the latter and 1 and 5 indifferent.] 
2. It's the same. I'm just trying to find a roughly same point now for 
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you two, so that the point that you've just been discussing and the point 
I just named is roughly the same as far as you two are concerned. 
3. For compensation, is that correct? 
2. I will ..• , I could see supporting a point that is, oh, what would it 
be here, say, (38, 61) something like that. [ 2 - $5.75 which is less 
than his amount at (40, 60) but it is better for both of his "partners".] 
l. That's a little better for me. [ $22. 79] 
2. That's closer to you as well, O'Malley, so that it should be ..• 
5. I would, I would 
l. That's really hurting you, Charlie, I think. [ 3 - $6. 00 is clear that 3 
would be affected. Why does 1 ask? It would seem to be a poor 
strategy.] 
5. I would guess Bob, given your center point, that the amount you have 
to gain •.. 
2. I think my numbers may be misnumbered here, am I supposed to 
have the same value all way around the circle? 
P. (Plott walks over to check his chart). 
3. Bob, I would guess that given your position down there, the amount 
that you gain by that move is quite different from the amount I lose. 
2. I doubt it, you see, they have set this up to consider that possibility 
and the point you people suggested gives me nothing, absolutely 
nothing. But, a small gradation inward means that I can get some-
thing out of it, something more than zero, now granted you will go 
down, but I doubt that given the distance you are away that it will 
be zero. [2- $2.25at (32, 65).] 
l. Oh, it goes down. It goes down~ much. [ 1 - From $18. 64 to about 
$5.50.] 
5. What number is it that you are proposing? 
2. I'm proposing (38, 61) I believe I said, something roughly that. 
5. Well, you know you have to get above 61 for me, otherwise it's, ah .•• 
2. 62 .•. then ( 38, 62). 
1. Now, now I'm indifferent between .•. 
5. Yeah, (38, 62) I'm indifferent too. 
mean I make out the same as the 
point which we have selected before 
between Charlie and I, Mike and 
myself and that number was (32, 65)? 
Is that correct? [Actually (38, 62) 
gives him $0. 75 more.] 
3. Yes. 
5. Or (32, 66)? [This would make up 
the $0. 75.] 
1. No, (32, 65) was the point. 
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50L---~~--~~--~----~----~ 
2.0 so 40 50 60 70 
Continuation of proposed paints 
and proposing individuals in 
parenthesis. 
5. (32, 65) was the number that we had chosen before between the three 
of us, isn't that correct Charlie? 
3. ( 32, 65), yea. 
2. Well, (36, 63)? 
5. What? 
2. ( 36, 63). 
5. I'm still indifferent. [True] 
3. Well, now wait a minute. What if you go up on that, Bob, to (36, 66)? 
If that goes up to around 70? That kills some people, huh? [ 31- $15. 00] 
4. What happens to ... ? 
1. Yeah, I know. No, I'm out of the 
running on that. That knocks me out 
of the ball-game. (1- $13. 15 at 
(36, 66) and $7.00 at (36, 70).] 
2. Well, what about say, (39, 70), is 
that appealing to you at all Charles? 
5. Wow! It's pretty appealing to me. 
Wow 1 It's in my center point 
(39, 68). (Laughs). 
3. It's not appealing at all to me. 
[3- $9.64.] 
l. (39, 70). You know, it's not real 
bad but I got a big hunch that 
we're losing money, Bob. 
50L---~----~----~----~_.--~ 
zo 30 .ell 5<l 60 To 
Continuation of proposed points 
and individuals making proposals 
in parenthesis. 
2. Well, of course, but .•. 
1. No, I mean as an aggregate we are losing money up there. 
2. I have no way of knowing. I just don't know what your map looks 
like. 
1. You see, we are talking about two different ways to maximize our 
profits here, in other words you can find probably two of us who 
can find one or two different points to which we are indifferent 
which will increase or decrease the third person's profit but since 
we have not changed, we are somewhat indifferent, so at that point, 
perhaps we should step down to our second way of maximizing and 
ask how much the third person is going to gain, in other words, 
we are losing more all the way around. 
2. Except. •. how can you do that? You can't. 
3. He smiles, look at that! That smile. [Reference is to 5 who is 
evidently still pleased by the (39, 70) suggestion.] 
Well, what about Jeanine? 
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2. 
4. My problem is the y axis problem. As long as 
it doesn't make any difference. It is terrible. 
you stay around 60, 
[Around $1.50 within 
2. 
4. 
the 35 - 40 x range.] 
Well, what about like at 70? Is there a threshold where it becomes 
at all meaningful? 
Yeah, 70 as long as x is somewhere between 35 and 40 becomes 
better. [ $3.00 to $6. 00] 
2. Oh, and then anything above 40 is good? [He sees their harmony of 
interest.] 
5. Charlie, you and I are the two closest together, aren't we? 
3. You are, you are over at .•. 
5. I am at (39, 68) and you are at (32, .•. ). 
1. Well, that whole line of 70 between those 
2. Jeanine, what does his maximum point look like to you? [Is this 
proto coalitional behavior?] 
4. Let's see, he's ... 
2. He's like (39, 70 ... 68), is that meaningful to you at all? 
4. Oh, yeah, a little bit, but not much -- not anything to write home 
about. [ 4 - $5. 00.] 
2. What if Mike moved it to like (39, 70)? 
4. Yeah, well. 
2. I am sorry, (40, 70), would that ••. ? 
4. Yeah, that's better, my problem is really a y axis problem, I 
increase a lot with the y increments. 
2. Ah, what about say move that a little further to like (43, 71) or 
something like that, say moving a little closer? 
3. Very fast drop off from this point of view. [3 - $4. 98.] 
1. Yeah, I'm out. [ 1 - $3. 50.] 
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3. Goes from the difference of big profit to none, almost. Tremendous 
difference. 
4. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
3. 
4. 
Mine's a little better but not appreciably. 
Okay, ah •.. 
Let me ask you something. Do you have fast drop off or a slow 
drop off from your maximum? 
I have a very slow drop off. [ $0. 11 I unit] 
Very slow drop off. So even after that point you have some that are 
okay? 
Even out to, ah, between 70 and 80 range on the y axis and up to 35 
or 45 on the x axis I'm still okay, but not .•. [Defines an "above 
$5. 00" range.] 
1. Okay, that, that takes me out of the ball game, well, not totally 
but .•• [About $7. 50 maximum.] 
2. I don't know, I'm kind of prepared to go, I know what Jeanine 
apparently with ... she ... you can live within above 35 and above 
on the y axis, what amount would you say on the y axis you'd want 
to be above? 
4. Well, I could take above 65. 
2. Above 65. 
4. Below 65 would 
2. Yeah. 
1. Are you talking about 35, Bob? 
2. Yeah, so that I would be willing to go with, like O'Malley's maximum 
point. 
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3. Let me say this: (35, 70). [ 3 - $18.64. Is he trying to break up 
the conversation?] 
2. 
5. 
2. 
I would go with your maximum point. 
(Laughs). Wow! Heavy stuff going on here. 
And that would, because Jeanine will, I think, would be willing to go 
along with that because that way she will get something, and I will 
go along because I will get something, nothing close to the maximum 
by any means. 
3. 
l. 
Let me ask Mike ... [Is he still trying to change the subject?] 
O'Malley! Let me ask you this. Do you want to maximize your own 
return or maximize the aggregate amount? [He decided to force the 
issue directly.] 
5. (Laughs). 
2. (Continuing). But something and they [referencing the other two 
players 1 and 3] too will get something. 
3. Now let me ask Mike this (35, 70). [He continues to interrupt.] 
2. Aggregate value is a meaningless statistic since we can't split it 
unless O'Malley is going to take us out to dinner. [Is this an attempt 
to get a bribe?] 
3. How do you feel about (35, 70)? 
1. 35 what? 
3. (35, 70). How do you feel there? 
l. (35, 70). Poorly, very poorly. [1- $6. 50.] 
[The following conversations continue in parallel.] 
2. Ah, ... how far out do you go 
O'Malley, and still be part of 
this? Apparently you have a 
very fast drop off. What is the 
point where you drop off? 
5. My proportion? 
2. Yeah, is it like one line, two 
lines. Is that what you are 
facing? 
5. Well, can I tell ... ? Can I tell 
proportions of how much i.t 
drops? (question directed to 
experimenter). 
3. Okay now, (35, 70) is not a bad 
place for me. The center point 
that we picked is exactly the same 
for me. [Correct] So the question 
here is whether Jeanine and Bob 
gain more than you are losing 
there.(addressed to No. 1). 
2.. That's super false (in answer to 
No. 3's con1nwnt). 
l. Moving away fl·orn our triangle 
center point in the direction of 
Jeanine is very bad for me. 
2. 
5. 
2. 
2. 
Don't tell me proportions. Just 
say, you know, where the really 
big drop is like, one line, two 
lines ..• 
Yeah, about two lines. 
Two lines? Then how about like •.• 
You mean, at the center space I 
can go two increments. 
Then, how about giving you the 
max there within like one 
coordinate? 
5. Pardon me. Where would that be? 
3. 
l. 
3. 
l. 
3. 
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I think it's bad for all of us if 
we stick with him. 
I think we ought to stick in the 
triangle. 
(To No. 1). At our center 
point how are you, at the center 
point we picked? 
Fairly good. It's fairly good 
for me. 
O'Malley, at the center point 
of our triangle (trying to 
interrupt 2 and 5). 
2. Well, like as I remember your coordinates roughly (42, 68) or some-
thing like that. [Notice the x axis "error." which is in 2's interest.] 
5. My coordinate is (39, 68). 
2. (39, 68). So it would be like (41, 68)? Would that be ..• ah? 
5. Yeah, I guess .•. Oh, I see ..• wait a second, I have a question on 
how this is numbered (to experimenter). [This is possibly a rhetorical 
question since he exhibited a full understanding above and on the test.] 
(Experimenter checks his chart). 
2. So it makes a big difference being on that one point or is it just you 
have a couple of lines and then it makes a big difference. 
5. Well, it makes a difference being on that point. 
l. O'Malley, if you move away from the center point of the triangle along 
the line, couldn't the center point of the triangle and your base point •.• 
2. You seem to be moving across this very screwy territory where I am 
dropping off quickly and Charlie is dropping off too. If you move off 
line ... 
3. (Interrupting). I'm dropping off quickly. 
5. See, he's asking me essentially to move out parallel with the line 
which is drawn, which bisects the angle formed by the lines formed 
by your two points or mine. 
3. Where does he want to move? He is interested in what (38, 70) or 
sornething? (Notice the errors on both axes are in his own interest.] 
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5. Yeah, he wants me to move, oh, he is at 41. He wants me to move 
to my right essentially. 
2. Toward Jeanine and myself. 
l. Yeah, he wants to move away from the line, that line between the 
center of the triangle and your vertex. 
5. Now what I want to ask is how much of it, is that a significant 
difference to move that slight difference or is it a Eig difference? 
l. But it's a big difference to me and a big difference to Charlie. 
5. I know, you guys are making me feel bad. 
l. We're trying (laughter). 
3. I think we should remain dedicated to the proposition that we want 
to aggregate the whole income. 
2. 
3. 
5. 
l. 
5. 
l. 
5. 
l. 
5. 
l. 
5. 
l. 
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l. 
But we cannot aggregate! 
We want to get the largest aggregate. 
What's being demonstrated in this experiment is that there is one 
swing person, i.e., me and ... 
Right, and you can .•. 
I can strike a bargain with those two or those two. 
Right, and in the bargain you get more money and they get a little 
bit, apparently 
Right. 
Or you can go with us, the three of us, get a fairly large amount each. 
Or there is a third alternative. I could sit tight on my spot and you 
two guys could come over because you know •.. 
Right, you could keep your spot if you want to, you can bargain 
with those two to get your spot over our bargain. 
Or I could bargain with you two to keep my spot if you see what 
I am saying. 
I'm just about indifferent between your spot and the spot he wants. 
Yeah. 
It comes down to what you want to do, do you want to n1aximize 
the money yourself, you want to maximize what goes to the three 
of us. 
5. I've got a question to ask. The figure we come up with on this 
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chart is that going to be the amount that we get paid? (More rhetoric.] 
P. You get paid. 
5. I get paid. 
P. You get paid. 
l. Everybody else gets paid according to their own graph. 
5. Swell! Wow! That's higher than I usually get paid. Boy! You don't 
know what they are paying law clerks this summer. Wow! 
3. Well, I would like to make a motion that we go back to what we 
consider was our optimal point before, which was (32, 65) and go 
with that. 
2. I'll go with your point. You will get all you can. Your point. 
5. Wow! Heavy stuff going on here. 
l. It's just up to O'Malley to decide. [Note the agenda moves below 
will determine whether O'Malley must "decide" or let the "votes" 
decide.] 
2. I move that we adopt the dark colors which is I understand, your 
point is in the dark red, right? 
3. Now wait, we don't have to start with that, we can start with the 
points. We can start with the point and then do that. 
l. Let's get the whole thing wrapped up and decide on the point and 
then the three people who are going to go with that point just vote 
them all the way through and if you screwed, it's going to come 
down to that anyway. 
3. And the proper point to pick depends anawful lot on how fast yours 
is dropping off and how fast she is picking up from them and from 
what I understand from her, she would not be terribly much more 
hurt at our central point than at the slightly more beneficial point 
that Bob was suggesting. The drop off for Mike and I is very great 
out there, for O'Malley the pick up should be some, ah ... some-
what but not nearly what we are dropping off. 
2. Yeah, for n1e the drop off where you people are going is very, very 
great. I get nothing out there at all! 
l. Yeah, you see that was what happened no matter what point we pick. 
2. Okay, right, but he was saying that was not the case. 
3. No, I was saying, it depends on how much, not just the percentage 
drop off but the amount CJf the drop off. 
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2. Yeah, I realize that, but at that point, mine is nothing, I don't know 
about Jeanine but my drop off is big. 
(End of side one] 
(Very little conversation was lost here] 
Relative Payoffs 
(32, 65) (39, 68) 
l. $19.00 $7.50 
2. $ 2.20 $5.25 
3. $18.64 $8.75 
4. $ l. 90 $5. 25 
5. $ 3.00 $9.45 
True Payoffs Between the Points 
Continuation of proposed points 
and proposing individuals in 
parenthesis. 
2. The point on O'Malley's, or very close to O'Malley's is what 
we ought to go with, and I am willing to go with that, and I think 
Jeanine ..• 
5. I need to make one point and that point is that the longer we stay here 
the less we get paid. (The current proposal is his maximum.] 
2. That's right. 
3. So O'Malley's really got to confront the question of ... 
l. Whether he wants to screw out a brother classmate! 
5. Well, how fast do your numbers drop off? 
3. They drop ... moving from our center point toward your center point, 
moving from the center of the triangle toward your vertices they drop 
off very quickly. 
5. I am talking about moving from, okay, I see what you're saying, okay, 
fine. 
3. Moving along that line they drop off very quickly. 
5. Right, because ... , yeah, okay. How about moving, have you drawn 
a line from each one of the angles formed by the triangle which 
intersects the center ideal point? 
3. No, I'm just 
5. Draw those, and then once you got the line coming from the angle 
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which is formed at my vertices, how fast you guys drop off once you 
go that direction? 
l. Which direction? 
3. Well, for instance take the point approximately (35, 65). [A concess-
ion from (32, 65) of almost $5.00 to him.] 
5. That's the worst for me. 
1. (35, 65), that's over from where we were ..• 
5. That's quite a bit worse for me. 
2. That's worse for me. 
l. That's the question, how much you want to give up O'Malley? 
5. Really! What a rude dude! 
l. Okay, well, I think we've isolated the options. I am going to have to 
proceed on the assumption that the numbers are the same on each 
one of these things although maybe they are not. 
2. They are not. 
l. We don't know that. 
2. Well, I'm saying they're not! If you people, unless you have a very 
different sense of compensation and you people are saying that you 
go five spaces, you've got nothing then obviously, if I'm even in this ... 
3. He's assuming the center points are approximately the same. 
5. Oh, gee, you know by the time I get out there at the center point I've 
got, I've lost my, far and away, the major proportion of my com-
pensation. [Recall earlier he was ready to accept it.] 
l. What center point? 
5. Center point of our triangle. 
l. The triangle? 
5. Yeah. Now, is that true with you guys? 
P. He can't answer, you shouldn't say percentages. (Notice the subtle 
way in which quantitative information can be conveyed at a critical 
time.] 
2. Oh, because he said more than 50% or something? 
5. I'm sorry. 
3. What Mike, you can't go ... does it help you a lot to go up a 
little bit, or not? 
1. Ah ... 
3. You have a very rapid ••• 
1. It helps me more to go to the right which is obviously bad, worse 
for you. 
3. Yeah, it's fairly fast there, fairly fast going two to three to the 
right, it moves fairly fast. But you lose fast if you go a couple up? 
1. If I go one up, I lose not too much, I guess I can go one up. 
5. How about to the right? 
1. 
P. 
3. 
1. 
From the center point of the triangle I can go right three. Can I do 
this? (to experimenter). 
That's okay. 
I can go towards the right without losing a lot. (This contradicts 
previous claims.] 
Okay. 
4. If you go to the right and up then that increases me too. 
1. O'Malley, I'm indifferent between going one up and three to the 
right, relatively. (True] 
3. Well, three to the right is fine, but if we do that it would also be 
good to go up two. 
5. How about (35, 68)? 
1. That's taking me out of it. ( 1 - about $9. 7 5.] 
3. I thought you said if we went up 
l. No, I said we can ... 35 what? 
5. (35, 68). 
l. (35, 68) I'm indifferent, no, wait a minute, (35, 68), yeah, that's 
taking me out of it. 
3. How about (34, 68)? How are you there? 
1. 34? 
3. ( 34, 68). 
l. It's they axis that ... there is a big drop off between (34, 68) and 
say ( 34, 64). Moving along the y axis is hurting me a lot. Moving 
along the x axis isn't hurting much at all. 
4. Well, we must have the same problem, because I have the reverse 
problem. 
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1. So see, by moving above 65 on the 
y axis I start getting hurt at, you 
know, fairly good chunks. 
3. Well, I've got a little triangle here 
drawn with the points (32, 65) at 
one point (32, 67) as one point and 
(34, 65) at one point and (34, 68) 
at one point sounds like somewhere 
around in that area we are doing 
best. 
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5. See, I am not convinced that Charlie ..• 
it sounds to me that everybody here may 
have a much slower gradation drop off 
than I do. (False.] 
50 ~~~~~~~~~~~~----= 
zo 30 ~ 60 70 
3. Yeah, could be. 
Continuation of proposed points 
and proposing individuals in 
parenthesis. 
5. Well, how is that is your drop off real great, Bob, if we go up 
to about 68? That helps you I think. 
2. 68 yes, really great, great drop off. (About $0. 50/unit] 
3. And you've got to come all the way down to 64 to do well? 
1. What about 65 O'Malley? 
5. 56, what? 
1. Ah, the center point of the triangle. 
5. I know, 65 ... 
1. No, wait, wait (32, 65). 
5. Well, that's just what we were talking before, by the time we get 
out there, I don't really care for it anymore (laughs). 
1. Okay, you'd like to move to the right, and Charlie wants to move 
up. 
5. Wow! I'll say! 
3. How much would you like to move to the right? 
1. (32, 65)? 
3. A move to the right doesn't hurt you too bad, right, Mike? 
l. A move to the right doesn't hurt me. I could move up ... 
3. It hurts me quite a bit but it seems O'Malley thinks it is very 
important to him. 
1. By moving ... if I go out to 35 on the x axis and move up one, 
there is a fairly healthy chunk coming out of there. [About $2. 50 
decrease.] 
3. Okay, how about 
l. The way, I mean, the way my concentric circles are drawn. 
3. Let's see, I just don't know how fast you go up, O'Malley. It's 
almost impossible, there is a circle around that point, and some-
where around in there, you know, we can't know very well what 
optimizes. 
l. What about ( 32, 66)? 
5. Fine with me. 
l. That's a little worse for me, but not too bad. 
3. That's doing you a little bit better, huh, O'Malley? 
5. As I've already said before, I really think, you know, the more we 
talk, the nwre I'n1 convinced perhaps what you guys should do, is 
give more towards n1y vertice, because I really don't think your 
gradation drop offs are as severe as mine, and 
3. You don't know the absolute amounts either. 
5. I know, we don't, but ••. 
l. O'Malley, you'd like to see as opposed to (32, 66), you'd like to 
see (33, 66). 
5. I'm indifferent between those two points. [There is a $0. 75 
difference which previously he would have called "large."] 
l. Are you? What about you Charlie? 
3. Let's see ( 33, 66). How about 30 .•. 
l. O'Malley wants to go up around 35 or more. 
5. Well, yeah, I'd love to, but I aon't want to take everything away 
from you guys. 
l. I can go up to (35, 65) and not lose too much. [1 • $16.25.] 
2. (33, 66) is bad for me. 
l. But I think Charlie is getting killed. 
3. 30 ... what? 
l. ... "· 65. 
3. Well, I don't get killed, but ... r3- $13.39.] 
5. Well, we're going up toward you! 
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l. No, we're going away from him, 35 on the x axis, 65 in the ... 
3. I don't get killed, but ... 
l. That's why I think the answer lies somewhere around (33, 66). 
5. I've really dropped off there. [5 - $3. 78.] 
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l. Okay, where would you move from there? I rnean really small points. 
[Notice the change in the "status quo" and the following maneuver by 1 
serves to distract 5 from his max.] 
5. From where? 
l. (33, 66). 
5. (33, 66), I'd move to .•. 
1. Small jumps! 
5. (34, 66) and I pick up some. 
l. Okay, I've lost a little bit, how 
about you Charlie? 
3. I've lost a little bit, but I can 
easily take it. 
(Laughter). 
5. Okay, let's call it (34, 66). [5 
seems to have fallen for the 
"trap" but then ..• ] 
l. Okay, I move that we take (34, 66). 
Continuation of proposed points 
and proposing individuals in 
parenthesis. 
5. Wait a minute, let me check on that, make sure ..• Wow! would that 
.be a bad deal! [ ... he "recomputes."] 
l. Let's everybody check your coordinates, make sure we are talking 
about the same points. 
5. 66 ... 35 ... (34, 66). 34 ... Okay, I'll vote for that. How's that 
work out for you, Bob? [Rhetorical question? He wants 2 to object?] 
2. Terrible, zero plus zero is zero. [About $2. 90] I mean, it's in a 
game like this where apparently it depends upon whether you choose 
profit maximize or not, it doesn't make any difference how much 
we are taking out of them because we can't. 
3. Oh, no, it matters a great deal, at center point of the triangle, I am 
taking a beating, I am taking a real beating and I knew well •.. 
2. From his center point to yours, I am taking a beating and she is 
taking a beating. 
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l. I'm not talking about the center points of our optimal point, the center 
point of the triangle that we worked out. 
~. To move from his center point to the point you suggest she and I 
take the beating. 
l. I think O'Malley already understands that it's either maximize his 
gain or 
2. No. 
l. Or maximize the gain of the three of us. 
l. He doesn't know that, he doesn't know what our drop off between your 
triangle point and his maximum point at all. 
l. And he can't. 
l. All we can say is that the difference ... 
l. So there's no point in talking about it. 
l. All we can say is that for us two, for him to move from his max 
point to the point you selected, hurts us very much and all you can 
say is move from the center of the triangle to your points, hurts 
you very much. Now O'Malley chose apparently not to profit 
maximize so there is no point in continuing from my point of view 
of discussing it because there is~ argument I can make to him 
to say, you know "okay, 11 there is nothing I can offer him. I mean 
if he won't take his max, what else can I do? He has chosen that she 
and I get less out of this and you two will get more, fine, if that's 
the way he has chosen -- if that is what he decides to do ••. 
3. The best he can do is look at the points and make a guess about 
optimization. 
~- Well, the best he can do ... 
L. 
~-
O'Malley has two choices and once he makes his two choices, he 
should go after them, we should talk about points. 
I mean if O'Malley has decided not to go with his max but to go with 
the lesser, then fine, he should say that and we should finish this 
right here because I have to leave. I've just got to leave! 
If he wants to take his max, then he and I are going to go with him, 
why should he go with you? 
Right. And so let's decide right now. I move that we go with 
O'Malley's maximum point, that's the motion on the floor and it's 
got to go 'With the majority vote. If you say no, then fine, that 
will be the end of it, but the motion as it goes with your maximum 
point, if you don't want the maximum point, then your vote will 
be decisive. 
l. Obviously Charlie and I are not going to support that, so it's .•• 
3. We don't have to support it. He can win right there so it's up to hitn. 
5. Wow! 
3. You've got to make a guess about what most money we all will get 
out of it. 
5. I would bet that if I .•. remember when we had to take all those 
psych experiments as a prerequisite for a grade in class? It 
reminds me of that ... you were always getting pimped in the end 
yeah ... I've got a question, if I take my center point, if I take the 
point we've already chosen (34, 66), Jeanine and Bob get anything? 
2. (34, 66)? 
5. Right. 
2. Well, for me to get nothing you have to go to, to give you an idea, 
point (125, 28) that's zero. 
N. You shouldn't say anything like that. 
2. I shouldn't say that when I get zero? 
N. No. 
2. Oh, I am sorry about that, but moving in, I mean it's a difference 
between that and very very small compensation, granted I will 
get something. It is impossible to get zero. 
4. I am in the same position. 
2. Just, you know, it is virtually zero. What the increments you were 
talking about is very different. 
l. 
3. 
l. 
5. 
3. 
2. 
O'Malley, the choices are two small and you large, are you in with 
three of us? 
I think we'll get three large here, and you get one large and two 
small there. 
Yeah, it's one large and two small. 
What happens when you get out to my point with you two guys, are 
you wiped out? 
Well, we're wiped out much more than they're gaining. 
You don't know that! 
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3. No, I don't. 
2. I mean, you people are still going to get something, you can't tell 
me that you are getting zero with O'Malley's maximum point. 
5. What has occurred is ... If I even go to where he says .•• If I go 
to the point where we have already, you know (34, 66), I have been 
already substantially depressed and 
l. (34, 66)? 
5. It seems as I understand from the conversation is that, if we go 
to that point and that they are effectively wiped out, and yet if we 
come back to my profit maximizing point, you two guys are still 
in the ball game and they are back in the ball game. 
2. We'll all get something. 
l. Yeah, but, I mean, what does the ball game mean? Relative to the 
point we worked out, I've taken a substantial beating by moving five 
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to the right and four up to your optimal point. I've taken a substantial 
beating. 
2. Okay O'Malley, that's a good issue now. 
5. My point is that everybody gets something, not only that and given 
the fact we're not supposed to divvy it up afterwards, you know, it 
would be nice for everyone to walk out of here with something and 
I really wonder whether or not this game is designed to show if we 
went to the point where it was best for me, that would be best for 
everybody, sort of like Adam Smith, the invisible hand leading 
everybody to the common good, but .•. ah. 
2. So, my motion is on the floor. 
S. Would you guys be really adverse? Because we don't know the 
gradation we are dropping off, we don't even know what the gross 
sums are. 
l. That's right, but ... I've taken a substantial beating by moving, I 
mean really a beating to move to that point. 
2. And I think we all are, as you say. We are all going to take a 
beating to go to your point to a degree but we will all come out 
with something, and it will not be, you know, all I guess on one 
value frame how much it is worth, but it is something. Whereas 
to go to the point between the three of you as you suggest, two of 
us will get for all intents and purposes, nothing. 
5. What do you think? 
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l. I think it comes down to you deciding whether you want to maximize .•. 
5. I don't think we can use that term. His argument was very persua-
sive. We don't know because we, I think, we have established at 
least preliminary that the gradations drop off differently for every-
one else. 
2. True. When we say maximizing that's an incorrect term to use 
because we don't know how much each person will have. 
l. O'Malley, we do know that at your highest point ..• 
5. And we do know that at my point that everybody gets something. 
l. Well, that's all you can say about that. I'm telling you, Charlie is 
telling you that your point, at your point relative to where we were 
before we've taken just a real beating, and we can't put it more 
quantitatively than that because that's based on my starting point. 
3. I think that from the discussion, I am ..• 
l. It's like four up, one down or three 
3. If we want to get the largest .•• 
5. We can talk about that, Charlie ... 
3. I know. 
5. Bob is right because we don't know, obviously, it is obvious to me 
at any rate that the monetary gradations are not similar on the 
various maps and •.• 
3. He is even talking about, he is way out 165 or something on the x 
axis, and he is quibbling about four points on the x axis over where 
we are. 
2. It does make a very big difference on my chart. 
3. I'm saying, I'm sure it does, if you •.• you wouldn't be talking 
about it. 
5. You know, between those two I could go either way on that, if I 
really thought you were gaining the way he is losing, and I just don't 
know, there is no way for us to figure that out without violating 
the rules. 
l. That's really where the fight is. 
3. I would guess that he's gaining more than Bob is losing here because 
of the distances, and the thing is ..• 
2. No, I wouldn't even be in the game if my distances ... the amount 
I can get from my points would compensate you. 
3. Would you actually be in the game if we picked his maximum point? 
4. See, I am the next .•. 
2. I mean, I wouldn't even bother ... (Standing up), look, my car is 
going to be towed away. I have to decide this in the next two or 
three minutes ... the motion is down, I think we have done all that 
we can ..• 
5. I think we should. 
l. I disagree. 
2. I made the motion. Can we vote on ... I made it a long time ago. 
N. We have to follow the agenda. 
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l. All right, O'Malley we've got four people who stand to . . • Each one 
of us, by picking your point, each one of us relative to our center 
points stand to lose substantially by picking your point. By picking 
the center of the triangle the other point we've picked out, you know 
that at least two more people are not losing very much relative to 
their starting point and you picked up a point that's relatively good 
for you. It comes down to three against two or one against four. 
2. Okay look, we've all said what we can at this point. I move to end 
debate on this issue. 
l. 
2. 
3. 
l. 
5. 
2. 
5. 
2. 
Now wait a minute, 
procedure.] 
still have the floor. [Note the sensitivity to 
He recognized me (reference is toN.), I don't know why. He's the 
parliamentarian, but really time constraints are on me, supposedly 
we have to go through these items now which is going to take some 
time apparently, so can we go right now to Item one. 
Well, no, it's not gonna take very much time at all, once we decide 
the coordinates. 
Let O'Malley think about it, give us an answer, then we'll go through 
that. 
Okay well, I think I'm going to pick my point, and it is not out of 
greed -- I think the game has been decided. 
Okay, it's decided, take your point. Item l, you are in the dark 
red, right? 
Yeah. 
What is your point? 
5. 
2. 
5. 
N. 
1. 
It's (39, 68). 
So I move Item l that we go with 
the dark. 
Approved. 
All right, so we'll take a vote now 
on Item 1 of the agenda, dark versus 
light. All those in favor of light? 
All those in favor of dark? 
[Unanimous pass.] Okay, you want 
to vote on Item 2? [The agenda 
theory predicts a "light" vote here. 
There was, of course a possibility 
that it would work in spite of all of 
the discussion. Subsequent exper-
ments have demonstrated that this 
particular agenda is not strong at 
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Continuation of proposed points 
and proposing individuals in 
parenthesis. 
this point. The vote tends to be light here, though seldom unanimous, 
without all of the foregoing discussion.] 
Yeah. 
2. Yes. 
N. 
I. 
N. 
1. 
N. 
1. 
N. 
No discussion? Okay, so Item 2, we are voting on dark blue, 
dark green versus dark red. All those for dark blue, dark green? 
You can still change your mind, O'Malley. 
All those for dark red? Everybody votes. 
It's 4 to I. I disagreed. [He votes no. Subsequent experiments 
reveal that this is a more interesting vote. Individuals 1, 3, 4 
should have voted "no" by the agenda model, and in other experiments 
where there is no "prior agreement" on a point before the vote, 
they do vote "no" here.] 
All right now, can we go because there are no more votes to be 
taken? Item 5, in the dark red area you have two labeled y, so 
the way will do this is someone make a proposal, and someone 
make another proposal and will take a vote between those two, and 
the winner, then you can make another proposal and keep on until 
we have a winner. 
Well, can we just have O'Malley pick the coordinates? 
He has to say the level, someone has to pick a coordinate. 
5. y 68. 
37 
N. All right, so we have a proposal that level y be 68. Is there 
another proposal? 
2. Okay, level y, 0. 
N. All right, we have another level y, so all those in favor of level y 
being 0? All those in favor of level y be 68? Okay now, the level 
of y 68, we have to choose the level of x, dark red area. 
2. 40. [Note this is to his advantage over the 39 he had previously 
suggested. It makes about $1.00 difference.] 
3. Hey, wait a minute, I don't think he said 40, did he? [The one unit 
is worth $1.50 to him.] 
5. No, I didn't. 
I. He said 39. 
3. And I'll say 0. 
2. I'll say 40 still. 
N. All right, we have a level of x at 40 and level x at 39. We have to 
take a vote between those two. 
2. You are better for Jeanine, you are saying 40? You guys are better 
at 40, aren't you? 
l. No. 
3. I think we'd better just stick with what we started out with. [About 
$1.50 difference.] 
N. All right, all those 
5. What are we voting on now? 
N. Those who like the level of x to be 40? Those who like the level of 
x be 39? 
5. Okay (39, 68). 
N. Somebody want to move to end debate? 
[End of Experiment] 
P. Calculate your payoffs and put them ... 
5. Yeah, and also calculate the payoff you would have gotten if we had 
picked the other points. [Notice his co~] 
3. It's what"? (39, 68)? 
N. (39, 68). 
P. All right, I'll tell you what ... 
3. 39? Wait a minute, let's get these points clear. 
5. (39, 68) is your ... 
P. You want to know what will maximize the total? Is that what you 
are asking? 
I. No, no. Can we reveal what we got? 
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5. (39, 68) is $9.45 and (32, 65) which is where we thought originally 
to be a good place, I get paid $2. 78. In the middle of the triangle, 
like it paid $2. 78, at the center point I get paid $9. 45. 
I. Center point of what? 
5. My center point. 
I. Okay, at the center point of the triangle O'Malley, I get $19.00. 
[He is mad.] 
5. Do you really? 
I. At the point we were talking about on the line, I get $15.00 and at 
the point you picked finally I get $8. 00. 
3. At the center point I get $18. 00. 
5. Center point of the triangle? 
3. Yeah, the point we were going to choose, $18.00, out here I get $8. 00. 
5. We have maximized. 
I. No, we haven't. 
5. I wonder how much they get, it will depend upon how much they get 
because he hasn't said, you know .•. 
I. How do you figure these, how do you figure this cutting and inter-
polate (39, 68), is the point which I got .•. ? 
5. Yeah, it's $9. 45. 
I. Hey, Bob, how much do you make? 
2. 7 bucks. 
5. Do we profit maximize at that point? 
P. Oh, no, profit maximize is way off in upper right somewhere. [ (51, 75)] 
That's because two of them get a lot more money. But, what do you 
say? Profit maximize is way up to the upper right. 
5. What would you have gotten at my ... at the point where we had 
chosen? 
3. This is the center point of the triangle we were talking about, I 
would have gotten about $20.00. [Is the exaggeration an atten1pt 
to make 5 feel bad?] 
N. No, you were going to get about $18.00. 
l. O'Malley, there is no way, aggregate amount v.ould have been the 
center of our triangle. 
P. For you three. 
5. But for the five of us ... 
P. That was way up to the right. 
? . Five, put five of us ..• 
5. No. How much did Bob get from us? 
P. That's up to him to say. 
[End of recording] 
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Appendix A 
INSTRUCTIONS 
General 
You are about to participate in a committee process experiment 
in which one of numerous competing alternatives will be chosen by 
majority rule. The purpose of the experiment is to gain insight into 
certain features of complex political processes. The instructions are 
simple. If you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might 
earn a considerable amount of money. You will be paid in cash. 
Instructions to Committee Members 
The alternatives are represented by points on the blackboard. 
The committee will adopt as the committee decision one and only one 
point. Your compensation depends on the particular point chosen by 
the committee (see attached payoff chart). For example, suppose your 
payoff chart is that given in Figure 1 and that the committee's final choice 
of alternative is the point (x, y) = (170, 50). 
y 
Figure 1 
Your compensation in this event would be $7, 000. If the policy of the 
committee is (140, 125) your compensation would be computed as 
follows: 
The point ( 140, 125) is half-way between the curve marked 
$7,000 and the curve marked $8,000. So, your compensation is half-
way between $7,000 and $8,000, i.e. $7,500. If the policy is one-
quarter of the distance between two curves, then your payoff is 
determined by the same proportion (i.e. at (75, 50) which is l/4 of 
the way between $8, 000 and $9, 000, you get $8, 250). 
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The compensation charts may differ among individuals. This 
means that the patterns of preferences differ and the monetary amounts 
may not be comparable. The point which would result in the highest 
payoff to you may not result in the highest payoff to someone else. You 
should decide what decision you want the committee to make and do 
whatever you wish within the confines of the rules to get things to go 
your way. The experimenters, however, are not primarily concerned 
with whether or how you participate so long as you stay within the 
confines of the rules. Under no circumstances may you mention anything 
quantitative about your compensation. You are free, if you wish, to 
indicate which ones you like best, etc., but you cannot mention anything 
about the actual monetary amounts. Under no circumstances may you 
mention anything about activities which might involve you and other 
committee members after the experiment (i.e. no deals to split up 
afterward or no physical threats). 
Parliamentary Rules 
The basic procedure will be simple majority rule. Given 
that there are 30, 000 integer points to choose among, we have 
provided an age11da for you to follow. This agenda is outlined on 
page 3 and should be studied carefully. It will also be covered by 
the chairman. 
Item 1 
dark vs. 
light 
light blue 
ight green 
yellow 
orange 
pink 
dark blue 
dark gree 
dark red 
Item 2 
blue 
based 
AGENDA 
Item 3 
yellow 
based 
Item 4 
red 
based 
Item 5 
level of 
y 
To be 
decided by 
proposals 
and dis-
cussion 
from the 
floor. 
Item 6 
level of 
X 
3 
To be 
decided by 
proposals 
and dis-
cussion 
from the 
floor. 
Item 1. Do we want to consider further only the light colored areas 
or only the dark colored areas? 
I am in favor of considering further only the dark 
colored areas. 
I am in favor of considering further only the light 
colored areas. 
Item 2. Do we want to consider further only the areas with a blue 
based color (blue and green) or only those areas without a 
blue based color (yellow, orange, pink, red)? 
I am in favor of considering further only those areas 
with a blue based color. 
I am in favor of considering further only those areas 
without a blue based color. 
Item 3. Do we want to consider further only those areas with a 
yellow based color (yellow, orange, green) or only those 
areas without a yellow based color (blue, pink)? 
I am in favor of considering further only those areas 
with a yellow based color. 
I am in favor of considering further only those areas 
without a yellow based color. 
Item 4. Do we want to consider further only those areas with a red 
based color (orange) or only those areas without a red based 
color (yellow)? 
I am in favor of considering further only orange. 
I am in favor of considering further only yellow. 
Item 5. Within the remaining area what shall be the level of y? 
(Proposals and amendments on the exact level should come 
from the floor.) 
Item 6. Within the remaining area what shall be the level of x? 
(Proposals and amendments on the exact level should come 
from the floor.) 
Are there any questions? 
We would like you to answer the questions on the attached 
pages. These should help you understand the instructions. 
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Question Section of Individual Instructions 
1. At-------- I would make the most possible money. The 
amount I would receive is-------
2. At-------- I would make the least possible money. The 
amount I would receive is -------
3. Suppose the top box at Item 1, the one that contains the light 
colors, received a majority of the votes. Then, the next item 
to be considered on the agenda is--------------
5 
and it consists of a vote between the color(s) -----------
and the color(s) -------------
4. U the dark colors receive a majority of votes at Item 1, would 
there be a vote at Item 4? Answer Yes or No U the 
light colors receive a majority vote at Item 1, could the point 
(100, 100) ultimately be chosen? Answer Yes or No-----
5. Fill in the blanks. 
Ultimate Majority Choice at Item Number My com-
choice 1 2 3 4 pensation 
(120, 20) 
(20, 120) 
(45, 55) 
(65, 95) 
6. If at Item 5 the alternatives have been narrowed to the light blue 
area then the y which can yield me the highest compensation is 
-----------------? Dark Blue ? 
PARLIAMENTARY RULES FOR CHAIRMAN 
Read the appropriate portions at the appropriate times. 
Recognition rule: Raise your hand to be recognized by the chair. 
Voting rule: The basic voting rule is simple majority rule. An issue 
passes if it passes by a majority of those present. 
Rule to break ties (read this if necessary): If a tie vote occurs, discussion 
of the motion is again opened. After debate a second vote is taken. If a 
tie occurs again, debate is opened again and a vote is taken. If a tie occurs 
again, the committee moves to consider the next issue. Any ambiguity at 
the end of the last item can be removed by a motion from the floor. 
Rule to end debate: If someone wishes to end the debate on an item, they 
simply move to end debate. If there is no objection to ending debate, the 
item is voted upon. 
(Read if necessary) 
If there is objection to ending debate, the motion to end debate will be 
recognized by the chair. A vote on the motion to end debate will be taken. 
If it passes by majority of those voting, the debate ends. If the motion 
to end debate fails, debate on the main motion continues. 
Agenda Example (review if necessary): 
The agenda committee has adopted the agenda which is before you. Notice 
that each item on the agenda is designed to restrict the number of programs 
which may receive further consideration. 
Example: Choice of a banquet 
Alternative No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Type of Food 
Mexican 
Mexican 
French 
French 
Dress 
Formal 
Informal 
Formal 
Informal 
Item I: Shall we have a formal dress banquet or not? Notice that an 
answer to this question will restrict further deliberation to either 
or 
2 
Item 2. What type of food? Notice that an answer to this question is 
now all that we need to decide upon a specific alternative. 
Actual Agenda: 
There are six items on the agenda. Be sure to record your vote in 
the appropriate blank at the time of voting. 
Item 1. Shall the choice be in a dark colored area or a light colored area? 
Item 2. Shall the choice be in a blue based area or not? 
Item 3. Shall the choice be in a red based area or not? 
Item 4. Shall the choice be in a yellow based area or not? 
Item 5. Within the chosen color what shall be the level of y? 
Item 6. What shall be the level of x? 
We shall take up these items in the sequence listed. 
be limited to that germane to the item on the floor. 
to subsequent items will be ruled out of order. 
Special notes on Items 5 and 6. 
Discussion will 
Discussion related 
The first suggested number will serve as a motion on the floor. Subsequent 
proposals will be treated as amendments and each amendment will be voted 
upon prior to the considerations of subsequent amendments. The floor 
rcrnains open until there are no more proposed amendrnents or until a move 
to end debate is accepted. The rnolion on the floor, as amended, will then 
be voted upon. 
APPENDIX B: Sample Indifference Map -- Player 3, Series 1, High Payoff 
